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ABSTRACT
Email is a private medium of communication, and the in-
herent privacy constraints form a major obstacle in devel-
oping effective spam filtering methods which require access
to a large amount of email data belonging to multiple users.
To mitigate this problem, we envision a privacy preserv-
ing spam filtering system, where the server is able to train
and evaluate a logistic regression based spam classifier on
the combined email data of all users without being able to
observe any emails using primitives such as homomorphic
encryption and randomization. We analyze the protocols
for correctness and security, and perform experiments of a
prototype system on a large scale spam filtering task.
State of the art spam filters often use character n-grams
as features which result in large sparse data representation,
which is not feasible to be used directly with our training and
evaluation protocols. We explore various data independent
dimensionality reduction which decrease the running time
of the protocol making it feasible to use in practice while
achieving high accuracy.
General Terms
Privacy Preserving Machine Learning, Spam Filtering
1. INTRODUCTION
Email is a private medium of communication with the
message intended to be read only by the recipients. Due
to the sensitive nature of the information content, there
might be personal, strategic, and legal constraints against
sharing and releasing email data. These constraints form
formidable obstacles in many email processing applications
such as spam filtering which are usually supplied by a sepa-
rate service provider.
Over the years, spam has become a major problem: 75.9%
all emails sent in August 2011 were spam [11]. Email users
can benefit from using accurate spam filters, which could
greatly reduce the loss of time and productivity due to spam
email. A proficient user can directly learn a spam filtering
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classifier on her own private data and send it to the spam
filtering provider or apply it herself, diminishing the need for
a privacy preserving spam filtering system. It is, however,
seen that the accuracy of spam filters based on classification
models can be vastly improved by training on aggregates
of data obtained from a large number of email users. This
training and application of spam filters should, however, not
be at the expense of user privacy, with users being required
to make their emails available to the spam filtering service
provider.
In this paper we propose a solution that enables users to
share their private email data to train and apply spam fil-
ters while satisfying privacy constraints. We choose logistic
regression as our classification model as it is widely used
in spam filtering and text classification applications and is
observed to achieve very high accuracy in these tasks. The
training algorithm for logistic regression based on gradient
ascent is more amenable to be modified to satisfy privacy
constraints. The update step in the training algorithm is
also particularly convenient when the training data is split
among multiple parties, who can simply compute their gra-
dient on their private email data and the server can privately
aggregate these to update the model parameters. Further-
more, logistic regression is can also be easily modified to the
online learning setting. In a practical spam filtering system,
as the users are unlikely to relabel previously read emails as
spam, the classifier needs to be learned on a continuously
arriving stream of email data.
Although primarily directed at spam filtering, our solution
can also be applied to any form of private text classification
and in general to any binary classification setting where pri-
vacy is important, e.g., predicting the likelihood of disease
based on an individual’s private medical records. Our meth-
ods also extend to batch processing scenarios.
Formally, we consider two kinds of parties: a set of users
who have access to their private emails and server who is
interested in training a spam classification model over the
complete email data. The users can communicate with the
server but not with each other as this is typically the case in
an email service. The primary privacy constraint is that the
server should not be able to observe the emails belonging to
any of the users and similarly, any user should not be able to
observe emails belonging to any other user. The secondary
privacy constraint is that the users should not be able to
observe the parameters of the classification model learned by
the server. While the motivation behind the former privacy
constraint is more obvious, the server might want to keep
the classification model private if it was privately trained
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over large quantities of training data pooled from a large
number of users and if the server is interested in offering
a restricted pay per use spam filtering service. We present
protocols to train and evaluate logistic regression models
while maintaining these privacy constraints.
Our privacy preserving protocol falls into the broad class
of secure multiparty computation (SMC) algorithms [15]. In
the SMC framework, multiple parties desire to compute a
function that combines their individual inputs. The privacy
constraint is that no party should learn anything about in-
puts belonging to any other party besides what can be in-
ferred from the value of the function. We construct our
protocol using a cryptosystem satisfying homomorphic en-
cryption [9], in which operations on encrypted data corre-
spond to operations on the original unencrypted data (Sec-
tion 3.2). We further augment our protocol with additive
and multiplicative randomization, and present an informa-
tion theoretic analysis of the security of the protocol.
The benefit of training and evaluating a spam filtering
classifier privately comes with a substantial overhead of com-
putation and data transmission costs. We find that these
costs are linear in the number of training data instances and
the data dimensionality. As the size of our character four-
gram feature representation of the text data is extremely
large (e.g., one million features), application of our protocol
on a typical email dataset is prohibitively expensive. To-
wards this, we apply suitable data dimensionality reduction
techniques to make the training protocol computationally
usable in practical settings. As the same dimensionality re-
duction is has to be applied by all the parties to their private
data, we require that the techniques used are data indepen-
dent and do not require to be computed separately. We
present extensive evaluation of our protocol on a large scale
email dataset from the CEAS 2008 spam filtering challenge.
With data independent dimensionality reduction such as lo-
cality sensitive hashing, multinomial sampling, and hash
space reduction, we demonstrate that our protocol is able
to achieve state of the art performance in a feasible amount
of running time.
To summarize, our main contributions are:
• Protocols for training and evaluating the logistic re-
gression based spam filtering classifier with online up-
dates from while preserving the private email data be-
longing to multiple parties.
• Analysis of the protocols for security and efficiency.
• Dimensionality reduction for making the protocol fea-
sible to be used in a practical spam filtering task.
• Experiments with the privacy preserving training and
evaluation protocols over a large scale spam dataset:
trade off between running time and accuracy.
2. RELATED WORK
Email spam filtering is a well established area of research.
The accuracy of the best systems in the 2007 CEAS spam
filtering competition was better than 0.9999 [3]. Our im-
plementation is an online logistic regression classifier imple-
mentation inspired by [5] which on application to binary
character four-gram features was shown to have near state
of the art accuracy [3].
The application of privacy preserving techniques to large
scale real world problems of practical importance, such as
spam filtering, is an emerging area of research. Li, et al. [6]
present a distributed framework for privacy aware spam fil-
tering. Their method is based on applying a one-way finger-
printing transformation [1] to the message text and compar-
ing two emails using a Hamming distance metric and does
not involve statistical learning. Additionally, this method
also requires that the spam emails belonging to all users
should be revealed which does not match our privacy crite-
ria. We consider all emails to be private as the nature of
the spam emails a user receives might be correlated to the
user’s online and offline activities.
There has also been recent work on constructing privacy
preserving protocols for general data mining tasks including
decision trees [12], clustering [7], naive Bayes [13], and sup-
port vector machines [14]. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first to describe a practical privacy-preserving
framework using a logistic regression classifier applied to a
real world spam filtering task.
3. PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Classification Model: Logistic Regression
in the Batch and Online Settings
The training dataset consisting of n documents classified
by the user as spam or ham (i.e., not spam) are represented
as the labeled data instances (x, y) = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
where xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ {−1, 1}. In the batch learning
setting, we assume that the complete dataset is available at a
given time. In the logistic regression classification algorithm,
we model the class probabilities by a sigmoid function
P (yi = 1|xi, w) = 1
1 + e−yiwT xi
.
We denote the log-likelihood for the weight vector w com-
puted over the data instances (x, y) by L(w, x, y). Assum-
ing the data instances to be i.i.d., the data log-likelihood
L(w, x, y) is equal to
L(w, x, y) = log
∏
i
1
1 + e−yiwT xi
= −
∑
i
log[1 + e−yiw
T xi ].
We maximize the data log-likelihood L(w, x, y) using gradi-
ent ascent to obtain the classifier with the optimal weight
vector w∗. Starting with a uniformly initialized vector w(0),
in the tth iteration, we update w(t) as
w(t+1) = w(t) + η∇L(w(t), x, y) = w(t) + η
∑
i
yix
T
i
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
,
(1)
where η is the pre-defined step size. We terminate the pro-
cedure on convergence between consecutive values of w(t).
In the online learning setting, the data instances are ob-
tained incrementally rather than being completely available
at a given instance of time. In this case, we start with a
model with the uniformly random weight vector w(0). A
model w(t) learned using the first t instances, is updated af-
ter observing a small block of k instances. with the gradient
of the log-likelihood computed over that block.
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
In a homomorphic cryptosystem, operations performed on
encrypted data (ciphertext) map to the corresponding oper-
ations performed on the original unencrypted data (plain-
text). If + and · are two operators and x and y are two
plaintexts, a homomorphic encryption function E satisfies
E[x] · E[y] = E[x+ y].
This allows one party to encrypt the data using a homo-
morphic encryption scheme and another party to perform
operations without being able to observe the plaintext data.
This property forms the fundamental building block of our
privacy preserving protocol.
In this work we use the additively homomorphic Paillier
cryptosystem [9] which also satisfies semantic security. The
Paillier key generation algorithm produces a pair of b-bit
numbers (N, g) constituting the public key corresponding to
the encryption function E : ZN 7→ ZN2 and another pair
of b-bit numbers (λ, µ) constituting the private key corre-
sponding to the decryption function D : ZN2 7→ ZN .
Given a plaintext x ∈ ZN , the encrypted text is given by:
E[x] = gxrn mod N2,
where r is a random number sampled uniformly from ZN .
Using a different value of the random number r provides
semantic security, i.e., two different encryptions of a number
x say, E[x; r1] and E[x; r2] will have different values but
decrypting each of them will result in the same number x.
It can be easily verified that the above encryption function
satisfies the following properties:
1. For any two ciphertexts E[x] and E[y],
E[x] E[y] = E[x+ y mod N2].
2. And as a corollary, for any ciphertext E[x] and plain-
text y,
E[x]y = E[x y mod N2].
Extending the Encryption Function to Real Numbers
Paillier encryption as most other cryptosystems is defined
over the finite field ZN = {0, . . . , N − 1}. However, in our
protocol we need to encrypt real numbers, such as the train-
ing data and model parameters. We make the following
modifications to the encryption function to support this.
1. Real numbers are converted to a fixed precision float-
ing point representation. For a large constant C, a real
number x is represented as bCxc = x¯.
E[x¯] = E[bCxc], D[E[x¯]] = E[bCxc]/C = x.
2. The encryption of a negative integer is represented by
the encryption of its modular additive inverse. If −x
is a negative integer,
E[−x] = E[N − x].
3. Exponentiation of an encrypted number by a negative
integer is represented as the exponentiation of the mul-
tiplicative inverse of the encryption in the ZN2 field,
by the corresponding positive integer. We represent
the exponentiation1 the ciphertext E[x] by a negative
integer −y as
E[x]−y = E[x−1 mod N2]y.
1We slightly abuse the notation to represent the non-
modular exponentiation of the ciphertext by E[x]a to refer
to E[x] · E[x] · · · (a times).
Representing real numbers by a fixed precision number
introduces a small error due to the truncation which is di-
rectly proportional to the value of C. This representation
also reduces the domain of the encryption function from
{0, . . . , N − 1} to {0, . . . , bN−1
C
c}. We need to ensure that
the result of homomorphic operations on encrypted func-
tions do not overflow the range, so we need to increase the
bit-size b of the encryption keys proportionally with C. As
the computational cost of the encryption operations is also
proportional to b, this creates a trade-off between accuracy
and computation cost.
The representation of negative integers on the other hand
does not introduce any error but further halves the domain
of the encryption function from {0, . . . , bN−1
C
c} to {0, . . . , bN−1
2C
c}
which we denote by D.
4. PRIVACY PRESERVING CLASSIFIER
TRAINING AND EVALUATION
4.1 Data Setup and Privacy Conditions
We define the party “Bob” who is interested in training a
logistic regression classifier with weight vector w ∈ Rd. In
the online learning setting, multiple users interact with Bob
at one time using their private training data as input. As
all these parties play the same role in their interactions with
Bob in one update step, we represent them by a generic user
“Alice”. Later on we see how Bob privately aggregates the
encrypted gradients provided by individual parties.
Alice has a sequence of labeled training data instances
(x, y) = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}. Bob is interested in train-
ing a logistic regression classifier with weight vector w ∈ Rd
over (x, y) as discussed in Section 3.1. The privacy con-
straint implies that Alice should not be able to observe w
and Bob should not be able to observe (xi, yi). The parties
are assumed to be semi-malicious, i.e., they correctly exe-
cute the steps of the protocol and do not attempt to cheat
by using fraudulent data as input in order to extract ad-
ditional information about the other parties. The parties
are assumed to be curious, i.e., they keep a transcript of
all intermediate results and can use that to gain as much
information as possible.
4.2 Private Training Protocol
Bob generates a public and private key pair for a b-bit
Paillier cryptosystem and provides the public key to Alice.
In this cryptosystem, Bob is able to perform both encryp-
tion and decryption operations while Alice can perform only
encryption.
As mentioned before, we use the homomorphic proper-
ties of Paillier encryption to allow the parties to perform
computations using private data. The update rule requires
Bob to compute the gradient of the data log-likelihood func-
tion ∇L(w(t), x, y) which involves exponentiation and divi-
sion and cannot be done using only homomorphic additions
and multiplications. We supplement the homomorphic oper-
ations with Bob performing those operations on multiplica-
tive shares to maintain the privacy constraints. As men-
tioned in Section 3.2, the domain of the encryption function
is D = {0, . . . , bN−1
2C
c}. We sample the randomizations uni-
formly from this set.
Bob initiates the protocol with a uniform w(0) and the
gradient update step η is publicly known. We describe the
tth iteration of the protocol below.
Input: Alice has (x, y) and the encryption key,
Bob has w(t) and both encryption and decryption keys.
Output: Bob has w(t+1).
1. Bob encrypts w(t) and transfers E[w(t)] to Alice.
2. For each training instance xi, i = 1, . . . , n, Alice com-
putes
d∏
j=1
E[w(t)j ]
yixij = E
[
d∑
j=1
yiw(t)jxij
]
= E
[
yiw
T
(t)xi
]
.
3. Alice samples n numbers r1, . . . , rn uniformly from
ZN = {1, . . . , N − 1} and computes
E
[
yiw
T
(t)xi
]
· E[−ri] = E
[
yiw
T
(t)xi − ri
]
.
Alice transfers E
[
yiw
T
(t)xi − ri
]
to Bob.
4. Bob decrypts this to obtain yiw
T
(t)xi − ri. In this way,
Alice and Bob have additive shares of the inner prod-
ucts yiw
T
(t)xi.
5. Bob exponentiates and encrypts his shares of the inner
products. He transfers E
[
e
yiw
T
(t)xi−ri
]
to Alice.
6. Alice homomorphically multiplies the quantities she
obtained from Bob by the exponentiations of her cor-
responding random shares to obtain the encryption of
the exponentiations of the inner products.2
E
[
e
yiw
T
(t)xi−ri
]eri
= E
[
e
yiw
T
(t)xi
]
.
Alice homomorphically adds E[1] to these quantities
to obtain E
[
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)xi
]
.
7. Alice samples n numbers q1, . . . , qn from D using a
bounded Power law distribution3. She then homomor-
phically computes
E
[
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)xi
]qi
= E
[
qi
(
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)xi
)]
.
She transfers these quantities to Bob.
8. Bob decrypts these quantities and computes the recip-
rocal 1
qi
(
1+e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
) . He then encrypts the reciprocals
and sends them to Alice.
9. Alice homomorphically multiplies qi with the encrypted
reciprocals to cancel out her multiplicative share.
E
 1
qi
(
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
)
qi = E [ 1
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
]
.
2In some cases, the exponentiation might cause the plain-
text to overflow the domain of encryption function. This
can be handled by computing the sigmoid function homo-
morphically using a piecewise linear sum of components.
3We require that q has the pdf P (q) ∝ 1/q for 1 ≤ q ≤ |D|.
q can be generated using inverse transform sampling. We
discuss the reasons for this in Section 5.2.
10. Alice then homomorphically multiplies the encrypted
reciprocal by each component of yix
T
i to obtain the
encrypted d-dimensional vector
E
[
1
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
]yixTi
= E
[
yix
T
i
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
]
.
She homomorphically adds each encrypted component
to obtain∏
i
E
[
yix
T
i
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
]
= E
[∑
i
yix
T
i
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)
xi
]
.
This is the encrypted gradient vector E
[∇L(w(t), x, y)].
11. Alice homomorphically updates the encrypted weight
vector she obtained in Step 1 with the gradient.
E[w(t+1)] = E[w(t)] E
[∇L(w(t), x, y)]η
= E
[
w(t) + η∇L(w(t), x, y)
]
.
12. Alice then sends the updated weight vector E[w(t+1)]
to Bob who then decrypts it to obtain his output.
In this way, Bob is able to update his weight vector us-
ing Alice’s data while maintaining the privacy constraints.
In the batch setting, Alice and Bob repeat Steps 2 to 11
to perform the iterative gradient descent. Bob can check for
convergence in the value of w between iterations by perform-
ing Step 12. In the online setting, Alice and Bob execute the
protocol only once with using Alice using a typically small
block of k data instances as input.
Extensions to the Training Protocol
1. Training on private data horizontally split across mul-
tiple parties.
In the online setting we do not make any assumption
about which data holding party is participating in the
protocol. Just as Alice uses her data to update w pri-
vately, other parties can then use their data to perform
the online update using the same protocol.
In the batch setting, multiple parties can execute one
iteration of the protocol individually with Bob to com-
pute the encrypted gradient on their own data. Finally,
Bob can receive the encrypted gradients from all the
parties and update the weight vector as follows.
w(t+1) = w(t) + η
∑
k
∇L(w(t), xk, yk),
where (x1, y1), . . . , (xK , yK) are the individual datasets
belonging to K parties.
2. Training a regularized classifier.
The protocol can easily be extended to introduce `2
regularization, which is a commonly used method to
prevent over-fitting. In this case the update rule be-
comes
w(t+1) = w(t) + η∇L(w(t), x, y) + 2λw(t),
where λ is the regularization parameter.
This can be accommodated by Alice homomorphically
adding the term 2λw(t) to the gradient in Step 11.
E[w(t+1)] = E[w(t)]
1+2λ E
[∇L(w(t), x, y)]η
= E
[
(1 + 2λ)w(t) + η∇L(w(t), x, y)
]
.
In order to identify the appropriate value of λ to use,
Alice and Bob can perform m-fold cross-validation by
repeatedly executing the private training and evalua-
tion protocols over different subsets of data belonging
to Alice.
4.3 Private Evaluation Protocol
Another party “Carol” having one test data instance x′ ∈
Rd is interested in applying the classification model with
weight vector w belonging to Bob. Here, the privacy con-
straint require that Bob should not be able to observe x′ and
Carol should not be able to observe w. Similar to the train-
ing protocol, Bob generates a public and private key pair for
a b-bit Paillier cryptosystem and provides the public key to
Carol.
In order to label the data instance as y′ = 1, Carol needs
to check if P (y′ = 1|x′, w) = 1
1+e−wT x′
> 1
2
and vice-versa
for y′ = −1. This is equivalent to checking if wTx′ > 0. We
develop the following protocol towards this purpose.
Input: Bob has w and generates a public-private key pair.
Carol has x′ and Bob’s public key.
Output: Carol knows if wTx′ > 0.
1. Bob encrypts w and transfers E[w] to Carol.
2. Carol homomorphically computes the encrypted inner
product.
d∏
j=1
E[w]x
′
j = E
[
d∑
j=1
wjx
′
j
]
= E
[
wTx′
]
.
3. Carol generates a random number r and sends E
[
wTx′
]−
r to Bob.
4. Bob decrypts it to obtain his additive share wTx′ − r.
Let us denote it by −s, so that r − s = wTx′.
5. Bob and Carol execute a variant of the secure million-
aire protocol [15] to with inputs r and s and both learn
whether r > s.
If r > s, Carol concludes wTx′ > 0 and if r < s, she
concludes wTx′ < 0.
In this way, Carol and Bob are able to perform the classi-
fication operation while maintaining the privacy constraints.
If Bob has to repeatedly execute the same protocol, he can
pre-compute E[w] to be used in Step 1.
5. ANALYSIS
5.1 Correctness
The private training protocol does not alter any of the
computations of the original training algorithm and there-
fore results in the same output. The additive randomization
ri introduced in Step 3 is removed in Step 6 leaving the
results unchanged. Similarly, the multiplicative randomiza-
tion qi introduced in Step 7 is removed in Step 9.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the only source of error is
the truncation of less significant digits in the finite precision
representation of real numbers. In practice, we observe that
the error in computing the weight vector w is negligibly small
and does not result in any loss of accuracy.
5.2 Security
The principal requirement of a valid secure multiparty
computation (SMC) protocol is that any party must not
learn anything about the input data provided by the other
parties apart from what can be inferred from the result of
the computation itself. As we mentioned earlier, we assume
that the parties are semi-malicious. From this perspective,
it can be seen that the private training protocol (Section 4.2)
is demonstrably secure.
Alice/Carol: In the private training protocol, Alice can only
observe encrypted inputs from Bob and hence she does not
learn anything about the weight vector used by Bob. In the
private classifier evaluation protocol, the party Carol with
the test email only receives the final outcome of the classifier
in plaintext. Thus, the only additional information available
to her is the output of the classifier itself, which being the
output is permissible under the privacy criteria of the prob-
lem.
Bob: In the training stage, Bob receives unencrypted data
from Alice in Steps 3, 8 and 12.
• Step 3: Bob receives yiwT(t)xi − ri. Let us denote this
quantity by v and ywTx by z, giving us v = z − ri.
Since ri is drawn from a uniform distribution over the
entire finite field ZN , for any v and for every value
of z there exists a unique value of ri such that v =
z− ri. Thus, Pz(z|v) ∝ Pz(z)Pr(z− v) = Pz(z).4 The
conditional entropy H(z|v) = H(z), i.e., Bob receives
no information from the operation.
• Step 8: A similar argument can be made for this step.
Here Bob receives v = qz, where z = 1 + e
yiw
T
(t)xi . It
can be shown that for any value v that Bob receives,
Pz(z|v) ∝ Pz(z)Pq(v/z)z . Since q is drawn from a power
law distribution, i.e. Pq(q) ∝ 1/q, for all v < |D|,
Pz(z|v) = Pz(z). Once again, the conditional entropy
H(z|v) = H(z), i.e., Bob receives no information from
the operation.
• Step 12: The information Bob receives in this step is
the updated weight vector, which is the result of the
computation that Bob is permitted to receive by the
basic premise of the SMC protocol.
Information Revealed by the Output
We assume that all the parties agree with Bob receiving the
updated classifier at the end of the training protocol, this
forms the premise behind their participation in the protocol
to start with. If the parties use the modified training pro-
tocol which results in a differentially private classifier, no
information about the data can be gained from the output
classifier. In case the parties use the original training proto-
col, the output classifier does reveal information about the
4The notation Px(X) denotes the probability with which the
random variable x has the value X.
input data, which we quantify and present ways to minimize
in the following analysis.
At the end of Step 12 in each iteration, Bob receives the
update weight vector wt+1 = wt+η∇L(w(t), x, y). As he also
has the previous weight vector wt, he effectively observes the
gradient ∇L(w(t), x, y) =
∑
i yix
T
i
(
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)xi
)−1
.
In the online setting, we normally use one training data in-
stance at a time to update the classifier. If Alice participates
in the training protocol using only one document (x1, y1),
the gradient observed by Bob will be y1x1
(
1 + e
y1w
T
(t)xi
)−1
,
which is simply a scaling of the data vector y1x1. As Bob
knows w(t) he effectively knows y1x1. In particular, if x1 is a
vector of non-negative counts as is the case for n-grams, the
knowledge of y1x1 is equivalent to knowing x1. Although
the protocol itself is secure, the output reveals Alice’s data
completely.
Alice can prevent this by updating the classifier using
blocks of K document vectors (x, y) at a time. The protocol
ensures that for each block of K vectors Bob only receives
the gradient computed over them
∇L(w(t), x, y) =
K∑
i=1
yix
T
i
(
1 + e
yiw
T
(t)xi
)−1
=
K∑
i=1
g(w(t), xi, yi)xi,
where g(w(t), xi, yi) is a scalar function of the data instance
such that g(w(t), xi, yi)xi has a one-to-one mapping to xi.
Assuming that all data vectors xi are i.i.d., using Jensen’s
inequality, we can show that the conditional entropy
H
[
xi|∇L(w(t), x, y)
] ≤ K − 1
K
H[xi] + log(K). (2)
In other words, while Bob gains some information about the
data belonging to Alice, the amount of this information is in-
versely proportional to the block size. In the online learning
setting, choosing a large block size decreases the accuracy of
the classifier. Therefore, the choice of the block size effec-
tively becomes a parameter that Alice can control to trade
off giving away some information about her data with the
accuracy of the classifier. In Section 6.2, we empirically ana-
lyze the performance of the classifier for varying batch sizes.
We observe that in practice, the accuracy of the classifier is
not reduced even after choosing substantially large batches
of 1000 documents, which would hardly cause any loss of
information as given by Equation 2.
5.3 Complexity
We analyze the encryption/decryption and the data trans-
mission costs for a single execution of the protocol as these
consume a vast majority of the time.
There are 6 steps of the protocol where encryption or de-
cryption operations are carried out.
1. In Step 1, Bob encrypts the d-dimensional vector w(t).
2. In Step 3, Alice encrypts the n random numbers ri.
3. In Step 4, Bob decrypts the n inner products obtained
from Alice.
4. In Step 5, Bob encrypts the exponentiation of the n
inner products.
5. In Step 8, Bob decrypts, takes a reciprocal, and en-
crypts the n multiplicatively scaled quantities.
6. In Step 12, Bob decrypts the d dimensional updated
weight vector obtained from Alice.
Total: 3n+ 2d encryptions and decryptions.
Similarly, there are 6 steps of the protocol where Alice
and Bob transfer data to each other.
1. In Step 1, Bob transfers the d-dimensional vector w(t)
to Alice.
2. In Step 3, Alice transfers n randomized innner prod-
ucts to Bob.
3. In Step 5, Bob transfers the n encrypted exponentials
to Alice.
4. In Step 7, Alice transfers n scaled quantities to Bob.
5. In Step 8, Bob transfers the n encrypted reciprocals to
Alice.
6. In Step 11, Alice transfers the d dimensional encrypted
updated weight vector to Bob.
Total: Transmitting 4n+ 2d elements.
The speed of performing the encryption and decryption
operations depends directly on the size of the key of the
cryptosystem. Similarly, when we are transfering encrypted
data, the size of an individual element also depends on the
size of the encryption key. As the security of the encryption
function is largely determined by the size of the encryption
key, this reflects a direct trade-off between security and effi-
ciency.
6. EXPERIMENTS
We provide an experimental evaluation of our approach
for the task of email spam filtering. The privacy preserv-
ing training protocol requires a substantially larger running
time as compared to the non-private algorithm. In this sec-
tion, we analyze the training protocol for running time and
accuracy. As the execution of the protocol on the original
dataset requires an infeasible amount of time, we see how
data independent dimensionality reduction can be used to
effectively reduce the running time while still achieving com-
parable accuracy.
As it is conventional in spam filtering research, we re-
port AUC scores.5 It is considered to be a more appropri-
ate metric for this task as compared to other metrics such
as classification accuracy or F-measure because it averages
the performance of the classifier in different precision-recall
points which correspond to different thresholds on the pre-
diction confidence of the classifier. The AUC score of a
random classifier is 0.5 and that for the perfect classifier is
1. We compared AUC performance of the classifier given
by the privacy preserving training protocol with the non-
private training algorithm and in all cases the numbers were
identical up to the five significant digits. Therefore, the er-
ror due to the finite precision representation mentioned in
Section 5.1 is negligible for practical purposes.
5Area under the ROC curve.
Table 1: Email spam dataset summary.
Section Spam Non-spam Total
Training 2466 (82%) 534 (18%) 3000
Testing 2383 (79%) 617 (21%) 3000
6.1 Email Spam Dataset
We used the public spam email corpus from the CEAS
2008 spam filtering challenge.6 For generality, we refer to
emails as documents. Performance of various algorithms on
this dataset is reported in [10]. The dataset consists of 3,067
training and 206,207 testing documents manually labeled as
spam or ham (i.e., not spam). To simplify the benchmark
calculations, we used the first 3000 documents from each set
(Table 1). Accuracy of the baseline majority classifier which
labels all documents as spam is 0.79433.
6.2 Spam Filter Implementation
Our classification approach is based on online logistic re-
gression [5], as described in Section 3.1. The features are
overlapping character four-grams which are extracted from
the documents by a sliding window of four characters. The
feature are binary indicating the presence or absence of the
given four-gram. The documents are in ASCII or UTF-8 en-
coding which represents each character in 8 bits, therefore
the space of possible four-gram features is 232. Following the
previous work, we used modulo 106 to reduce the four-gram
feature space to one million features and only the first 35 KB
of the documents is used to compute the features. For all
experiments, we use a step size of η = 0.001 and no regular-
ization or noise required for differential privacy is used.
Table 2: Running time comparison of online training
of logistic regression (LR) and the privacy preserv-
ing logistic regression (PPLR) for one document.
Feature Count LR PPLR
Original: 106 0.5 s 1.14 hours
Reduced: 104 5 ms 41 s
Table 3: Running time of privacy preserving logis-
tic regression for one document of 104 features with
different encryption key sizes.
Encryption Key Size Time
256 bit 41 s
1024 bit 2013 s
6.3 Protocol Implementation
We created a prototype implementation of the protocol
in C++ and used the variable precision arithmetic libraries
provided by OpenSSL [8] to implement the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. We used the GSL libraries [4] for matrix oper-
ations. We performed the experiments on a 3.2 GHz Intel
Pentium 4 machine with 2 GB RAM and running 64-bit
Ubuntu.
6The dataset is available at http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/
~gvcormac/ceascorpus/ The part of the dataset we have
used corresponds to pretrain-nofeedback task.
Table 4: Time requirement for steps of the protocol
for random matrices of the dimensions shown (doc-
uments × features).
Steps Time (s) - 200×20 Time (s) - 200×100
1 0.06 0.31
2, 3 2.59 10.14
4, 5 0.82 0.73
6, 7 0.46 0.41
8 0.84 0.73
9, 10 1.81 8.33
11 0.05 0.18
Total 6.61 20.81
The original dataset has 106 features as described in Sec-
tion 6.2. Similar to the complexity analysis of the training
protocol (Section 5.1), we observed that time required for
the training protocol is linear in number of documents and
number of features.
Table 2 compares the time required to train a logistic re-
gression classifier with and without the privacy preserving
protocol using 256-bit encryption for one document. It can
be seen that the protocol is slower than non-private ver-
sion by a factor of 104 mainly due to the encryption in each
step of the protocol. Also, we observe that the running
time is drastically reduced with the dimensionality reduc-
tion. While the execution time for the training protocol over
the original feature space would be infeasible for most ap-
plications, the execution time for the reduced feature space
is seen to be usable in spam filtering applications. This
motivated us to consider various dimensionality reduction
schemes which we discuss in Section 6.4.
To further analyze the behavior of various steps of the
protocol, in Table 4 we report the running time of individ-
ual steps of the protocol outlined in Section 4.2 on two test
datasets of random vectors. It can be observed that encryp-
tion is the main bottle neck among the other operations in
the protocol. We report the Paillier cryptosystem with 256-
bit keys in the following experiments. As shown in Table 3,
using the more secure 1024-bit encryption keys, resulted in
a slowdown by a factor of about 50 as compared to using
256-bit encryption keys. This is a constant factor which can
be applied to all our timing results if the stronger level of
security provided by 1024-bit keys is desired.
Using a pre-computed value of the encrypted weight vec-
tor E[w], the private evaluation protocol took 210.956 sec-
onds for one document using 106 features and 2.059 seconds
for one document using 104 features which again highlights
the necessity for dimensionality reduction to make the pri-
vate computation feasible.
6.4 Dimensionality Reduction
Since the time requirement of the privacy preserving pro-
tocol varies linearly with the data dimensionality, we can
improve it by dimensionality reduction principally because
data with fewer number of features will require fewer encryp-
tions and decryptions. On the other hand, reducing the di-
mensionality of the features, particularly for sparse features
such as n-gram counts, can have an effect on the classifica-
tion performance. We study this behavior by experimenting
with six different dimensionality reduction techniques, and
compared the running time and AUC of the classifier learned
by the training protocol.
We consider PCA which is a data-dependent dimension-
ality reduction technique and five other ones which are data
independent. The latter techniques are much more in our
setting as they can be used by multiple parties on their in-
dividual documents without violating privacy.
Table 5: Performance of PCA for dimensionality re-
duction.
Dimension Time (s) AUC
5 18 0.96159
10 37 0.99798
50 242 0.99944
100 599 0.99967
300 5949 0.99981
0.80
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
0 10 20 30 40 50
A
U
C
Time in seconds
Comparison of Dimensionality Reduction Methods
PCA LSH Hash Space
Sample Multinomial Sample Uniform Document Frequency
Figure 1: Time comparison for the dimensionality
reduction approaches reduced from 106 to 104 dimen-
sions.
1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA): PCA is
perhaps the most commonly used dimensionality re-
duction technique which computes the lower dimen-
sional projection of the data based on the most dom-
inant eigenvectors of covariance matrix of the original
data. Since we only compute a small number of eigen-
vectors, PCA is found to be efficient for our sparse
binary dataset. Table 5 summarizes the running time
and the AUC of the classifier trained on the reduced
dimension data. While the performance of PCA is ex-
cellent, it has the following disadvantages, motivating
us to look at other techniques.
Table 6: Time and space requirement for dimension-
ality reduction methods for reduction from 106 to 104
features.
Method Time (s) Space (GB)
PCA 7 ×106 41
LSH 50 ×103 40
Hash Space 41 –
Document Frequency 1 –
Sample Uniform 2 –
Sample Multinomial 490 –
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Figure 2: Performance of one iteration of logistic
regression training on 300 dimensional PCA feature
vectors with different batch sizes.
(a) When training in a multiparty setting, all the par-
ties are required to use a common feature repre-
sentation. Among the methods we considered,
only PCA computes a projection matrix which is
data dependent. This projection matrix cannot
be computed over the private training data be-
cause it reveals information about the data.
(b) For many classification tasks, reduction to an ex-
tremely small subspace hurts the performance much
more significantly than in our case. Furthermore,
computing PCA with high dimensional data is not
efficient and we are interested in efficient and scal-
able dimensionality reduction techniques.
2. Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH): In LSH [2], we
choose k random hyperplanes in the original d dimen-
sional space which represent each dimension in the tar-
get space. The reduced dimensions are binary and in-
dicate the side of the hyperplane on which the original
point lies.
3. Hash Space Reduction: As mentioned in Section
6.2, we reduce the original feature space to modulo
106. We experimented with different sizes of this hash
space.
4. Document Frequency Based Pruning: We select
features which occur in at least k documents. This
is a common approach in removing rarely-occurring
features, although some of those feature could be dis-
criminative especially in a spam filtering task.
5. Uniform Sampling: In this approach, we draw from
the uniform distribution until desired number of unique
features are selected.
6. Multinomial Sampling: This approach is similar to
the uniform sampling approach except that we first fit
a multinomial distribution based on the document fre-
quency of the features and then draw from this distri-
bution. This causes the sampling to be biased toward
features with higher variance which are often the more
informative features.
We ran each of these algorithms on 6000 documents of
106 dimensions. Table 6 summarizes the time and space re-
quirement of each algorithm for reducing dimensions to 104.
We trained the logistic regression classifier on 3000 training
documents with various reduced dimensions and measured
the running time and AUC of the learned classifier on the
3000 test documents. The results are shown in Figure 1. We
observe that the data independent dimensionality reduction
techniques such as LSH, multinomial sampling, and hash
space reduction achieve close to perfect AUC.
Classifier Performance for Varying Batch Size
As we discussed in Section 5.2, another important require-
ment of our protocol is to train in batches of documents
rather than training on one document at a time. We have
shown that the extra information gained by Bob about any
party’s data decreases with the increasing batch size. On
the other hand, increasing the batch size causes the opti-
mization procedure of the training algorithm to have fewer
chances of correcting itself in a single pass over the entire
training dataset. In Figure 2, we see that the trade-off in
AUC is negligible even with batch sizes of around 1000 doc-
uments.
6.5 Parallel Processing
An alternative approach to address the performance issue
is parallelization. We experimented with a multi-threaded
implementation of the algorithm. On average, we observed
6.3% speed improvement on a single core machine. We ex-
pect the improvement to be more significant on a multi-
core architecture. A similar scheme can be used to paral-
lelize the protocol across a cluster of machines, such as in
a MapReduce framework. In both of these cases, the ac-
curacy of the online algorithms will decrease slightly as the
number of threads or machines increase because the gradi-
ent ∇L(w(t), x, y) computed in each of the parallel processes
is based on an older value of the weight vector w(t).
A more promising approach which does not impact the
accuracy is encrypting vectors in parallel. In the present
implementation of the protocol, we encrypt vectors serially
and the procedure used for the individual elements is iden-
tical. We can potentially reduce the encryption time of a
feature vector substantially by using a parallel processing
infrastructure such as GPUs. We leave the experiments with
such an implementation for future work.
7. CONCLUSION
We developed protocols for training and evaluating a lo-
gistic regression based spam filtering classifier over emails
belonging to multiple parties while preserving the privacy
constraints. We presented an information theoretic analysis
of the security of the protocol and also found that both the
encryption/decryption and data transmission costs of the
protocol are linear in the the number of training instances
and the dimensionality of the data. We also experimented
with a prototype implementation of the protocol on a large
scale email dataset and demonstrate that our protocol is able
to achieve close to state of the art performance in a feasible
amount of execution time.
The future directions of this work include applying our
methods to other spam filtering classification algorithms.
We also plan to extend our protocols to make extensive use
of parallel architectures such as GPUs to further increase
the speed and scalability.
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